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The objective of reserve requirement as a policy tool is mainly to control money 
supply in the economy. However, the changes of reserve requirement also affect banks´ 
interest rates. Thus, the changes will have an effect on banking optimal behaviour in 
maximising profits. Using the industrial organisation approach, this paper will evaluate 
the  Indonesian banking  sector in the course of designing an unconventional reserve 
requirement policy that link a bank´s reserve requirement ratio to the bank´s loan to 
deposit ratio. When a bank´s loan to deposit ratio increases, the bank will have a smaller 
ratio of reserve requirement. This incentive mechanism was implemented to accomplish 
Bank  Indonesia´s  intentions  of  increasing  loan  growth  and  reducing  the  “excess 
liquidity” in the Indonesian banking sector. The paper reveals that the policy is effective 
in boosting bank loans and consequently decreasing excess liquidity. It also suggests 
that the policy could provide another tool for the central bank to impact bank liquidity 
in order to support financial system stability. 
 
 
Keywords: Reserve  Requirement,  Policy,  Macro-micro  Prudential,  Financial  System 
Stability, Incentive, Rate of Remuneration. 
 
























1.  Introduction 
 
In some countries, the central bank does not use reserve requirement as a monetary 
instrument. Reserve requirement is regarded as “old fashioned” in terms of monetary policy. 
However, in some other countries, reserve requirement is used extensively by the central 
bank  to  manage money  supply.  The  objective of  reserve  requirement  as  a policy tool is 
mainly to influence money supply in the economy. However, changes in reserve requirement 
can also affect banks’ optimal behaviour and interest rates in the profit maximisation effort. 
In Indonesia, during 2005 – 2008, an unconventional reserve requirement policy design was 
used to influence lending growth. The policy utilised the reserve requirement ratio to affect 
banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio and was introduced during a period of “excess liquidity” in the 
Indonesian  banking  sector.  The  term  of  “excess  liquidity”  in  this  paper  is  used  by  the 
Indonesian  central  bank  (Bank  Indonesia,  henceforth  BI)  and  is  also  called  “bank 
disintermediation”
3 - referring to a problem of perceived low loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) in 
the Indonesian banking sector. 
 
The existence of bank disintermediation gives an insight of how the central bank can 
influence banks in determining portfolio allocations and interest rates through its banking and 
monetary policies. Therefore, this paper intends to analyse the effectiveness of the reserve 
requirement policy  in  addressing the excess  liquidity  problem in  the  Indonesian  banking 
sector.  However,  the  causes  and  existence  of  the  excess  liquidity  problem  will  not  be 
discussed in this paper. These two aspects are treated as a given. A bank model will be used 
to assess the policy to give some recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the 
policy.  The  objective  of  the  policy  is  to  influence  banks  in  their  performance  of  the 
intermediation function – represented by their LDR – optimally based on the macroeconomic, 
micro-prudential and macro-prudential conditions. The policy provides incentives for banks 
that have a high LDR and conversely penalise those that have a low LDR. In this sense, a 
higher reserve requirement ratio will be charged to the banks with a low LDR. While a bank 
with low LDR increases their LDRs, the reserve requirement ratio decreases.  This works the 
opposite way with a bank with high LDR. 
 
This  unconventional  reserve  requirement  policy  is  interesting  because  on  the  one 
hand, the policy could appear to be ineffective. According to Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), 
who  built  an  ideal  banking  system  model  based  on  the  mean  variance  expected  utility 
approach, an increase in the reserve requirement ratio reduces bank deposits as well as bank 
loans. Therefore, the LDR could go up because of shrinking bank deposits. However, the 
LDR could remain constant if a decrease in bank loans is in the same proportion with a 
decrease in  bank deposits. LDR  could  also  decrease  if  bank  loans  decrease  in a  greater 
portion than bank deposits do. As a consequence, the low LDR problem remains unresolved 
and banks do not provide more lending to the private sector. On the other hand, Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988) and Agung et al (2001) claim that if a decrease in bank deposits is replaced by 
other funds that are not subject to reserve requirements, for example by liquidating the bank's 
portfolios on public bonds or other liquid assets, then the reserve requirement ratio will not 
reduce bank loans. Accordingly, with the right set up, the reserve requirement ratio could 
deliver two effects: 1) a decrease in banks' portfolio in public bonds or liquid assets without 
decreasing bank loans; and 2) an increase of LDR by decreasing bank deposits. In this way, 
                                                         
3 Bank disintermediation is also used to explain a condition where firms that have access to the bond market will 
issue private bonds to finance their businesses when the firms’ costs of issuing private bonds are lower than the 
firms’ costs of borrowing money from banks. In this case, the private bond becomes a competitor for bank 
ending.                                                                                 2 
 
the reserve requirement policy could resolve the excess liquidity problem in the banking 
sector.  This  could  take  care  of  the  case  of  the  disappearance  of  bank  lending  channel, 
especially  when  bank  disintermediation
4  exists  and  the  borrowers  become  less  bank 
dependent (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1995). This implies that a decrease in bank deposits due to 
monetary contraction could be offset by a decrease in public bonds or other liquid assets that 
are not subject to reserve requirements thus eliminating the necessity for banks to increase 
their loan rates and reduce their lending. 
 
Many approaches can be used to analyse the reserve requirement policy. The mean-
variance expected utility approach does very well in empirical works because the approach 
uses time series data and considers some risks involved in the model. However, the mean-
variance expected utility approach is more difficult to construct when the objective function 
involves many constraints such as banking or monetary policies, banks' customers' demand 
for loans or supply of deposits, and so on. It is also difficult to have reliable results when the 
data  is  not  available  or  has  many  of  the  usual  problems,  such  as  structural  breaks, 
multicollinearity,  etc.  As  a  consequence,  the  analysis  of  bank  behaviour  based  on  this 
approach is not flexible. Freixas and Rochet (1997) pinpoint some problems that relate to this 
approach. 
 
As  each  theory  has  special  characteristics,  none  of  the  theory  of  bank  behaviour 
dominates other theories. Therefore, this paper uses an alternative approach to overcome this 
inflexible  problem  in  studying  bank  behaviour.  This  alternative  approach  is  called  the 
Industrial  Organisation  Approach  which  considers  a  bank  as  a  firm  that  maximises  its 
objective function, namely profit function, directly from the revenue and cost functions given 
some constraints. Researchers who study bank behaviour using this approach are not as many 
as researchers of the Mean-variance Expected Utility Approach. The seminal papers based on 
this approach are pioneered by Klein (1971) and Monti (1972). The approach of Industrial 
Organization is simple but sufficiently powerful to address many issues related to the daily 
operations of banks. Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Matthews and Thompson (2008) mention 
that the Industrial Organization Approach can deal with a rich set of models for tackling 
different issues, such as monetary policy, market failure and some aspects of banking policy.
5 
Therefore,  the  Industrial  Organization  Approach  is  more  suitable  for  the  analysis  of  the 
comparative statics of bank behaviour for this paper. One of models of bank behaviour based 
on the Industrial Organization Approach is also known as the Monti Klein Model. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents reserve requirement 
policies  implemented by  BI  to  cope  with the excess  liquidity  problem  in the Indonesian 
banking sector. Section 3 describes the benchmark model of banking using a conventional 
reserve requirement policy. The new policy is then introduced into the model. Short analyses 
are also presented in this Section. Sensitivity analyses of the model are discussed in Section 4 
followed by the reserve requirement policy analysis in the Indonesian banking sector during 





                                                         
4 Refer to previous footnote for its definition. 
5 Besides the two approaches above, there are other approaches that are frequently used to determine bank's 
portfolio  allocation.  They are  known as the Value at Risks and Safety First approaches. These approaches 
involve the probability of every asset of banks over a period of time. However, these approaches are also not 
flexible enough to be used for investigating the effect of a new policy on bank behaviour.  3 
 
2.  The Reserve Requirement Policy in Indonesian Banking Sector 
 
The excess liquidity problem in the Indonesian banking system appeared during 2000 
- 2007 (Sabirin (2002), Zulverdy et al (2004) and Asih (2005) among others).
6  Banks  rather 
place their money in Bank Indonesia Certificates (henceforth SBI)
7 and public bonds than 
provide more lending to the private sector. To deal with the problem, BI introduced two 
policies. The first policy relates to the reserve requirement for commercial banks which was 
released  in  June  2004.  According  to  the  policy,  all  commercial  banks  were  required  to 
increase their reserves at the central bank following the new reserve requirement ratios. The 
policy stated that the ratios of reserve requirement be increased from 5% to 6% for banks that 
have third party funds between Rp 1 trillion and Rp 10 trillions, to 7% for banks that have 
third party funds between Rp 10 trillions and Rp 50 trillions, and to 8% for banks that have 
third party funds more than Rp 50 trillions. Banks that have third party funds less than Rp 1 
trillion would retain the same reserve requirement ratio of 5%. Furthermore, the policy also 
stated that BI would pay an interest rate of 3% for banks' excess reserves resulting from the 
policy (the rate of remuneration, Anderson (2008)) or on top of the originally 5% reserve 
requirement. 
 
According to Asih (2005), there were only 4 banks that had third party funds over Rp 
50 trillion but their share of total third party funds was more than 50% while more than 50% 
of the total number of banks had less than Rp 1 trillion of third party funds, which was less 
than  a  3%  share  of  all  third  party  funds  in  the  Indonesian  banking  sector  (Table  1). 
Effectively,  the  aggregated  reserve  requirement  ratio  rose  by  2.2675%  in  the  weighted 
average of total third party funds. Therefore, the ratio of reserve requirement increased from 
5% to 7.2675% for all third party funds. 
 
Table 1 
Group of Commercial Banks
8 
Group of Banks  Number of Banks  Share of Total Third Party Funds 
> Rp 50 trillions  4  52.69% 
Between Rp 10 – 50 
trillions 
12  26.19% 
Between Rp 1 – 10 
trillions 
47  18.01% 
< Rp 1 trillion  66  3% 
Total  129  100% 
 
 
In September 2005, BI introduced the second policy that revised the first policy of 
reserve requirement for commercial banks. For the second policy, the reserve requirement 
ratio  depended  on  both  the  third  party  funds  and  banks'  LDR.  The  ratios  of  reserve 
requirement that relate to the third party funds did not change from those of the first policy, 
but the ratios of reserve requirement would increase if banks had lower LDR than a certain 
percentage number. According to the second policy, a bank has to place more funds in BI as 
                                                         
6 See also the Bank  of  Indonesia Annual Reports from 2000 to 2007. See also Kompas newspaper printed 
edition on 30 April 2007 and website http://www.kompas.com. 
7  In  conducting  monetary  policy,  BI  uses  SBI,  short  for  “Sertifikat  Bank  Indonesia”  or  Bank  Indonesia 
Certificate (instead of public bonds) to influence the money supply through open market operations. However, 
SBI and public bonds have the same characteristics. In the model developed later, this paper will only use public 
bonds which is assumed to represent SBI and public bonds, as a monetary tool. 
8 As of May 2005. Data is taken from Table 2 in Asih (2005). 4 
 
required reserves if the bank has lower LDR than the limit. In other words, the higher the 
bank's loans to deposits ratio, the smaller the amount of money that the bank must place as 
required reserves given constant bank's deposit volumes, and vice versa. 
 
According to the second policy, the reserve requirement ratios would increase by 1% 
for banks whose LDR is between 75% and 90%, increase by 2% for banks that have LDR 
between 60% and 75%, increase by 3% and 4% for banks that have LDR between 50% and 
60%, and between 40% and 50%, respectively. Finally, the reserve requirement ratios are to 
increase by 5% for banks that have LDR below 40%. Moreover, the interests paid by BI for 
banks' excess reserves resulting from the second policy (or the excess reserve on top of the 
originally 5% reserve requirement) are to increase from 3% to 5.5%. These staggered ratios 
of reserve requirement and LDR relationship are depicted in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1 
Staggered Ratios of Reserve Requirement Policy 
 
The objective of the second policy is to provide banks with an incentive for increasing 
their LDRs, so as to increase bank lending to the private sector and thus mop up excess 
liquidity.  The  policy  is  also  aimed  to  penalise  banks  that  have  demonstrated  poor 
performances in their intermediation function. 
 
3.  The Model 
 
In  this  Section,  two  models  are  developed  with  the  first,  the  Benchmark  Model, 
representing a bank’s optimal decision in portfolio allocations and interest rates when the 
central  bank  imposes  a conventional  reserve requirement.  The  second  model describes  a 
bank’s  optimal  decision  in  portfolio  allocations  and  interest  rates  when  the  central bank 
imposes the reserve requirement policy that relates the reserve requirement ratio to the bank’s 
LDR. 
 
3.1  Benchmark Model with a Conventional Reserve Requirement Policy 
 
Using  the  Industrial  Organisation  Approach,  we  model  bank  behaviour  following 
Freixas and Rochet (1997). It is assumed that the model has a constant equity, an exogenous 
policy interest rate   (as a benchmark interest rate) and a concave profit function in order to 
simplify the model. In this profit maximisation problem, a monopolistic bank's objective is to 
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choose  loans   ,  liquid  asset   ,  and  deposits     to  maximise  its  profits.  The  bank's 
maximisation problem can be written in mathematical expression as: 
 
              =     +    −            (1) 
 
subject to: 
    +   +   =            (2) 
    =   +                (3) 
  =   −                (4) 
  =               (5) 
where   ≡ reserve requirement,    ≡ loan rates,    ≡ deposit rates and   ≡ ratio of reserve 
requirement. 
 
Equation (1) defines the bank’s profit maximisation in which we assume that fixed 
costs and the costs of managing loans and deposits are equal to zero. Besides simplification 
of the model, this assumption is intended to avoid any complication notation in the model. 
Equation  (2)  is  a  simple  balance  sheet  of  the  bank.  Equation  (3)  represents  the  bank’s 
customers’ supply of deposits. Parameter   is positive representing the responsiveness of the 
bank's customers' supply of deposits to a change in the bank's deposit rates. Parameters   
could be defined as external factors that affect the bank's customers' decisions to deposit their 
money in the bank. These external factors could include income, economic growth, inflation, 
or others. This equation implies that an increase in deposit rates will encourage the bank’s 
customers to increase deposits. 
 
Equation (4) describes the bank’s customers’ demand for loans. Parameter   has a 
positive value representing responsiveness of the bank's customers' demand for loans to a 
change in the bank's loan rates. Parameter   represents some external factors that could affect 
the bank's customers' decisions on borrowing funds from the bank with similar interpretation 
as described above.  This equation  says that an  increase  in  loan  rates  reduces the bank’s 
customers’ willingness to borrow money from the bank for financing their businesses and 
activities. Equation (5) is a simple reserve requirement equation where the bank’s reserves in 
the central bank are a certain portion of the bank’s total deposits. 
 
Let   be a Lagrangian function of the bank’s maximisation problem. The first order 
necessary conditions of Lagrangian function for maximum are: 
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where   , for   = 1,…,4 are Lagrange multipliers respectively for the bank's balance sheet, 
customers' supply of deposits, demand for loans and reserve requirement. The set of optimal 
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Equations (13) and (17) show that the bank's optimal solution on deposit volumes and 
interest rates depend only on the policy interest rates positively and the parameters of the 
bank's customers' supply of deposits function. Neither the loan volumes nor interest rate or 
the parameters of the bank's customers' demand for loan function has any influence on the 
bank's optimal solution on deposit volumes. Similarly, Equations (14) and (18) describe that 
the policy interest rate affecting bank's optimal solution on loan volumes negatively and on 
interest rates positively. They also depend on the parameters of the bank's customers' demand 
for loan function. Neither the deposit volumes nor interest rates or the parameters of the 
bank's  customers'  supply  of  deposits  function  have  any  influence  on  the  bank's  optimal 
solution on loan volumes. These relationships are similar to the standard analysis of bank 
behaviour  in  the  Monti Klein model that  can  be  found in  Freixas  and  Rochet  (1997) or 
Matthew and Thompson (2008). From these equations, we can see that reserve requirement 
optimally reduces bank deposit volumes and interest rates, but it does not have any effect on 
bank loan volumes and interest rates. 
 
Furthermore, the reserve requirement volume in Equation (15) depends on the policy 
interest rate and the parameters of the bank's customers' supply of deposits function. The 
bank's optimal solution on liquid assets in Equation (16) will not only depend on the policy 
interest rate and the parameters of the function of bank's customers' supply of deposits, but 
also the parameters of the function of bank's customers' demand of loans. From Equation 
(16), we can also see that the reserve requirement ratio reduces the bank’s optimal solution on 
liquid assets. 
 
3.2  Model with the Reserve Requirement Policy 
 
We  will  now  introduce  the  model  that  reflects  the  policy  relating  the  reserve 
requirement ratio to the LDR. Equation (5) above will be adjusted in order to comply with the 
policy. It is assumed that the bank will optimise the placement of its funds as reserves in the 
central  bank.  This  means  that  the  bank  will  not  place  any  excess  reserves  unless  it  is 
obligated by policy. Let   be a ratio of reserve requirement that relates to bank's LDR. It is 
assumed that the relationship has a continuous function
9 and the reserve requirement ratio has 
the lowest value of LDR reaching one or above
10. This parameter   will depend negatively on 





                                                         
9 Instead of staggered or discreet function, continuous function is chosen to simplify the model.  
10 This assumption is to simplify the model. According to the second policy, the reserve requirement ratio will 
reach the lowest value when the loan to deposit ratio reaches 0.9 or above. Changing from one to another value 
would be easy to do later. 7 
 
Figure 2 
The Adjusted Ratio of Reserve Requirement 
 
In  Figure  2,  adjusted  reserve  requirement  ratio  ( )  goes  up  if   
      falls.  This 
relationship  implies  that  along  with  the  increasing  of  bank's  LDR,  the  adjusted  reserve 
requirement ratio decreases until the point when the bank's loans to deposits ratio reaches 
unity. Mathematically, this relationship can be written as: 
 
  =    −   
 
                                                         (19) 
 
In  the  adjusted  reserve  requirement  ratio,      and      are  defined  as  the  reserve 
requirement  ratios  on  deposits  and  loans,  respectively.  The  reserve  requirement  ratio  on 
deposits can be interpreted as a maximum ratio of reserve requirement if the bank has a zero 
loan volume (an extreme condition), while the ratio of reserve requirement on loans can be 
interpreted as a discount ratio
11 when the bank has a higher LDR. The lowest adjusted reserve 
requirement ratio that the bank can achieve is    −   , where the bank's LDR is equal to 
one.
12 Here, the level of incentive and disincentive will be determined by the values of   . 
Required reserves can be seen as a cost for banks and the increase of the adjusted reserve 
requirement ratio   will potentially reduce banks' profits. Therefore, an increase in the bank's 
LDR when the reserve requirement ratio on loans    is high, will reduce the adjusted reserve 
requirement ratio    faster as compared to an equivalent increase in the bank's LDR when the 
reserve requirement ratio on loans    is low. In this case, the bank will have more incentives 
to increase its LDR. Conversely, the bank will suffer more penalties from decreasing its LDR 
when    is high. Therefore, an increase in    will reduce the required reserves of banks in the 
central bank given any LDR. This implies that the incentive and disincentive mechanisms 












                                                         
11 It is called as a discount ratio because it is a subtraction of the reserve requirement ratio on deposits. 
12 See footnote no 10. Bank's loan to deposit ratio could be greater than one. In this case, the adjusted ratio of  
reserve requirement is also equal to PD-PL. 
1 
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Figure 3 
Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms 
 
 
For  the  case  of  Indonesia,  Figure  3  intuitively  shows  that  the  incentive  and 
disincentive mechanism is larger when the bank's LDR falls below 60% as compared to that 
above 60%. The threshold of 60% of loan to deposit axis is picked as a critical point because 
the range of staggered ratio below 60% is 10% and the range of staggered ratio above 60% is 
15%. This condition can be confirmed by curve I that has a steeper slope compared to the 
slope of curve II. For simplification, these two curves are drawn considering the average of 
the LDR at every stage of the reserve requirement ratio. Mathematically, the two curves I and 























If we multiply Equation (19) by   and substitute it into Equation (5), then the reserve 
requirement function will have a new form as: 
 
   =     −     
 
  =     −              (20) 
 
Regarding the bank’s excess reserves resulting from the policies, the excess reserves 
can be formulated as: 
 
     =    −   
 
  −  ̅                                           (21) 
      =     −     −  ̅         (22) 
 
where   ̅  is  the  standard reserve  requirement  when  the  second  policy  does  not  exist  and 
   −   
 
  ≥  ̅. Therefore, the bank’s maximisation problem in Equation (1) can be altered by 
            =     +    −     +          
or 






















where    is the interest rate of excess reserves paid by the central bank to the bank (rate of 
remuneration) and it becomes an added profit for the bank. Including the excess reserves in 
the  model  is  almost  similar  to  the  model  of  Cosimano  (1987).  The  differences  are  (i) 
Cosimano’s model uses the dynamic framework and (ii) Cosimano uses the total reserves 
instead of the excess reserves. It is assumed that    is less than the policy interest rates   and 
is also less than the bank’s interest rates on deposits. Otherwise, the bank will have a chance 
of an arbitrage condition by borrowing from the interbank market or raising bank deposits 
and putting the money in the central bank. 
 
With these two adjustments, the model with the reserve requirement policy can be 
derived  similarly  with  the  benchmark model using  the  Lagrangian  approach. The bank’s 
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As we assume that   −    > 0 and comparing Equation (24) to Equation (13) and 
comparing Equation (28) to Equation (17), the bank’s optimal solutions on deposit volumes 
and interest rates are higher when the reserve requirement policy is imposed by the central 
bank. These conditions imply that the policy influence the bank to collect more deposits from 
its  customers.  As  a  consequence,  the  bank  increases  its  deposit  rates  to  encourage  its 
customers to increase deposits. Comparing Equation (25) to Equation (14), we can see that 
the bank’s optimal solution on loan  volumes is  also higher. Thus, an  increase  in deposit 
volumes will be balanced by an increase in loan volumes. As a result, the bank’s optimal 
solution on loan rates is lower to encourage bank’s customers to borrow more from the bank. 
This condition is confirmed by comparing Equation (29) to Equation (18). As both optimal 
solutions  on loans  and deposits  are  higher  when  the  policy  imposed,  the  bank’s optimal 
solution on liquid assets is ambiguous as this depends on how much bank loans increase as 
compared  to  the  increase  in  bank  deposits.  Therefore,  sensitivity analyses  are  needed  to 
explore the impact of the policy on bank’s optimal solution for liquid assets. The comparison 
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4.  Sensitivity Analyses 
 
The sensitivity analyses are carried out for a more comprehensive understanding of 
the  impact  of  the  reserve  requirement  policy  on  bank  behaviour,  especially  portfolio 
allocations and interest rates. We will differentiate the bank’s optimal solutions in Equations 
(24) to (27) with respect to the reserve requirement ratio on deposits and loans as well as the 




Sensitivities of Bank Portfolios and Loan-to-Deposit Ratio 




∆    0  -  -  -  + 
∆    +  0  -  -  + 
∆    -  +  +  ++  - 
L = loans; D = deposits; M = liquid assets; rR = rate of remuneration 
 
With regard to the pure reserve requirement (first row on Table 3), an increase in the 
reserve requirement ratio on deposits reduces the bank's optimal solution on deposit volumes 
without altering the bank's optimal solution on loan volumes. As a result, the bank's optimal 
solution  on  reserves  decreases  while  bank’s  LDR  goes  up.  The  increasing  reserve 
requirement ratio on deposits will also lead the bank to reduce its optimal solutions on liquid 
assets, as the rate of remuneration is less than the policy interest rate. 
 
With regard to the incentive/disincentive reserve requirement (second row on Table 
3), an increase in the reserve requirement ratio on loans raises the bank's optimal solution on 
                                                         
13 This table is modified and taken from Gunadi (2009).  11 
 
loan  volumes  without  changing  the  bank's  optimal  solution  on  deposit  volumes.  As  a 
consequence, the bank's LDR increases. Increasing reserve requirement ratio on loans also 
makes the bank decrease its optimal solution for liquid assets. 
 
Figure 4 
Pure and Incentive/Disincentive Mechanism of Reserve Requirement Ratios 
 
These changes of pure and incentive reserve requirements imply that the increasing 
ratio  of  reserve  requirement  on  deposits  is  similar  to  a  shifting  of  the  curve  of  reserve 
requirement ratio to the right, i.e. from curve I to curve III in Figure 4. Curves I and III have 
similar slope values but different intercept values. Meanwhile, increasing reserve requirement 
ratio on loans is similar to an increase in the slope of the curve of the reserve requirement 
ratio, i.e. from curve I to curve II. These conditions imply that a shift of the curve of the 
reserve requirement ratio to the right (upward) and an increasing of the slope of the curve of 
reserve requirement ratio will lead the bank to increase its LDR. 
 
Table 3 also shows that incorporating the rate of remuneration or the interest rate on 
the bank's excess reserves in the central bank (third row) will decrease the bank's optimal 
solution on  loan volumes. In contrast, the rate  of remuneration raises the bank's optimal 
solution  on  deposit  volumes.  This  implies  the  bank  will  collect  more  deposits  from  its 
customers to gain more profits which will lead to the raising of the bank's reserves. Increases 
in its liabilities side should be balanced by increases in the asset side of the bank's balance 
sheet. Thus, the bank will have more liquid assets and reserves in the central bank. As a 
result, the bank's optimal solution on liquid assets goes up and the bank will end up with a 
lower LDR. 
 
5.  Analysis of Indonesian Reserve Requirement Policies in 2005 - 2008 
 
As mentioned earlier, BI launched two policies to increase the banks’ LDR. There 
were three simultaneous changes on the model’s parameters from these two policies. First, BI 
increased the reserve requirement ratio on deposits (pure reserve requirement) by 2.2675% on 
weighted average. Second, BI linked the reserve requirement ratio to the banks’ LDR. Last, 
BI paid the bank for its excess reserves in the central bank at a rate of 5.5% per year. 
 
The model shows that increasing the reserve requirement ratio on deposits by BI is an 
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requirement ratio on loans, the effect of the regulation can be greater when the bank's LDR is 
less than 60% or as reflected by curve I in Figure 3, compared to that when the ratio is greater 
than 60%, or curve II in the same Figure. This is an effect caused by the magnitudes of slope 
and intercept of the curves of the reserve requirement ratio. These conditions can be seen 
from the magnitude of slope of curve I, which is greater than the magnitude of slope of curve 
II that has about 10 and 5 on average, respectively. The model shows that a steeper slope of 
the reserve requirement ratio curve will create a greater effect for increasing banks’ LDR. 
Therefore, the setup will allow for the optimal deliberation of reserve requirement policy in 
order to gain banks’ optimal solution on loan volumes and to shift the banks’ liquid assets to 
loans. 
 
Moreover, curve I also has a bigger intercept than the curve II. This implies that the 
bank will reduce loans when its LDR is below 60% compared to when its LDR is above 60%. 
The model also demonstrates that curve I with its larger intercept will give a greater effect of 
increasing  the  bank's  LDR  and  decreasing  the  bank's  optimal  solutions  on  liquid  assets 
(including Bank Indonesia Certificate). Therefore, curve I is more effective for increasing the 
bank's LDR. These conditions imply that in the case where the bank's LDR is greater than 
60%, the bank's optimal solutions on deposit volumes and liquid assets will decrease and the 
bank's optimal solution on loan volumes will increase. However, the changes of these assets 
will not be as much if the bank's LDR is less than 60%. 
 
According  to  Indonesian  banking  data,
14  the  Indonesian  banking  sector's  LDR  is 
around 73.2% - which is on the curve II. Thus, the reserve requirement ratio is around a 
weighted average of 6.715%, meaning that there will be a big reduction in banks' portfolio of 
liquid assets. However, there will be a slower reduction of banks' liquid assets and also a 
slower increase of banks' asset on loans. In other words, the condition will cause a decrease 
in the acceleration of the LDR growth in the Indonesian banking sector, although it is still 
high. If BI wants to motivate banks to reduce their liquid assets and increase their loans so 
that banks' LDR rises, then BI should increase the magnitudes of the slope and intercept of 
curve II. Conversely, BI has to decrease the magnitudes of slope and intercept of curve II if it 
wants to slow down the reduction of banks’ liquid assets and loans. 
 
However, slowing down the increase of the LDR could be one of BI's strategies for 
the Indonesian banking system. A deceleration of LDR growth is sometimes needed to avoid 
excessive loans from banks to the private sector. There will be a trade-off in the timing of the 
slowing of increasing LDR. If the central bank comes in too early to decelerate the increasing 
LDR, the economy may suffer from reduced loans and increased liquidity. In contrast, if the 
central bank is too late in slowing down the increasing LDR, the economy would also suffer 
from inflation and insufficient liquidity. Therefore, the timing for slowing down an increasing 
LDR is quite critical and would make for interesting future research. The ability of the (new) 
LDR-linked reserve requirement policy as a tool for delivering countercyclical impact on the 
banking system is one of the unique features of the policy. Therefore, this policy can be 
considered as a macro-prudential tool. 
 
The last impact of the reserve requirement policy is the 5.5% interest paid by BI for 
banks’ excess reserves. The model suggests that paying the interest will increase the banks’ 
optimal solution on liquid assets and deposits while decreasing banks’ optimal solution on 
loans. As a result, banks’ LDR falls. These conditions imply that the reserve requirement 
policy is counterproductive to BI's objective of increasing  banks' LDRs. Accordingly, the 
                                                         
14 As of December 2008, Bank Indonesia. 
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model suggests that the policy of paying interest on banks' excess reserves in BI should be 
abolished  in  order  to  achieve  the  optimum  effect  of  the  reserve  requirement  policy  of 
increasing the LDR of the Indonesian banking sector. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
We  analysed  the  effectiveness  of  the  reserve  requirement  policy  that  relates  the 
reserve  requirement  ratio  to  banks’  LDR.  A  simple  model  based  on  the  Industrial 
Organisation Approach was developed to assess the impact of the policy on bank behaviour 
in  determining  optimal  portfolio  allocations  and  interest  rates.  The  model  showed  that 
increasing the reserve requirement ratios on LDR will not only decrease the banks’ optimal 
solutions  on  deposit  volumes  but  would  also  increase  their  optimal  solutions  on  loan 
volumes. Therefore, the effect is very significant. The increase of the reserve requirement 
ratio on deposits is similar to a shifting of the curve of the reserve requirement ratio to the 
right, while the increase of the reserve requirement ratio on loans is similar to raising the 
magnitude of the slope of the reserve requirement ratio curve. Therefore, in the case of a low 
LDR, the significant effects of the reserve requirement regulation would be to increase the 
magnitude of slope of the curve and to push the curve to the right by raising both the reserve 
requirement ratios on deposits and loans. 
 
Based on the model’s results, we conducted sensitivity analyses for the changes of the 
reserve requirements ratios on deposits and loans as well as the rate of remuneration. These 
sensitivity analyses show that the positive changes of reserve requirements ratios can increase 
banks' LDR.  
 
The evaluation on the reserve requirement policy reveals that BI is on the right path 
for increasing banks' LDR in the Indonesian banking sector. The two reserve requirement 
policies are effective for dealing with the problem. However, the effect of the regulations can 
be optimised by adjusting the incentive and disincentive embedded in the policy design. The 
model also shows that the regulation of paying an interest for banks' excess reserves should 
be abolished to maximise the effect of the reserve requirement regulation of increasing banks' 
LDR. 
 
There are two issues that we think are important regarding the policy and the model. 
First, the reserve requirement  policy  could be hazardous  if  banks  have a  high  LDR  and 
therefore still have the incentive to provide more lending to the private sector. There are no 
tools in the regulation that have the capacity to reduce or stop excessive loan growth. The 
LDR-linked (incentive) reserve requirement is equipped with this feature, making it a macro-
prudential tool. Therefore, it is very important to study how excessive loan growth can be 
avoided  in  the  system.
15  Second,  bank  deposits  are  naturally  dominated  by  short  term 
deposits. It will indeed be very commendable if the incentive mechanism in lending is also 
accompanied by a restructuring of the maturity of deposits as banks will have less liquidity 
risks if they have a bigger share of longer-term deposits. These two issues will be our further 
research for improvement of the policy. In essence, the policy can be used as an instrument to 
strike a balance between monetary stability and financial stability. It can also be used to apply 
macro-micro prudential measures on the banking system. 
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